Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 1

Article

2012

Tort, Moral Luck, and Blame
Christopher Jackson

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Torts Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Christopher Jackson, Tort, Moral Luck, and Blame, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 57 (2012)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

TORT, MORAL LUCK, AND BLAME
CHRISTOPHER JACKSON*
For the last several decades, academics have been fighting over what we might
think of as the soul of tort law. Law & economic theorists contend that tort is about
the efficient allocation of the costs of accidents; traditionalists view tort as a law of
wrongs and redress. A common criticism wielded against the traditionalists is the
problem of moral luck: It is a bedrock principle of morality that you can only be
responsible for that which is under your control. But in many cases, whether and
how much a plaintiff recovers against a defendant will turn entirely on factors
outside of either party’s control. And if tort law is fundamentally at odds with a
bedrock principle of morality, then any view of tort as a law of wrongs is incoherent,
or at least morally arbitrary, and must be rejected.
While traditionalists have proposed a variety of answers to this critique, this
Article argues that the best response is two-fold. First, the scope of the problem of
moral luck is really quite limited: it applies only to the concept of moral blame. As
such, the traditionalist can neatly avoid objection entirely by grounding her tort
theory on notions of wrongdoing that don’t make use of blame. Second, the use of
the problem of moral luck in the context of tort law requires the law & economic
theorists to take on several controversial positions in the realm of normative ethics—
positions in conflict with many of our everyday moral judgments. While some
scholars may be perfectly happy to adopt these views, these unintended
consequences must be recognized, articulated, and defended before the law &
economic theorists can get any traction in their critique.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal theorists have long been fighting over what we might think of as the soul
of tort law. Traditionalists view tort as a law of wrongs and redress, an area of law
that is supposed to be responsive to the moral obligations we owe to each other.1
The law & economic theorists, on the other hand, believe that tort law is, or at least
ought to be, concerned only with the efficient allocation of certain kinds of losses—
it seeks to minimize the costs of accidents.2 One of the most common arguments
posed by the law & economic theorists is that traditionalism suffers from what is
known as the problem of moral luck: It is a bedrock principle of morality that you
can only be responsible for that which is under your control. But in many cases,
whether and how much a plaintiff recovers against a defendant in tort will turn
entirely on factors outside of either party’s control—it is a matter of luck whether a
person commits a tortious act, whether that tortious conduct actually causes an
injury, who it is who suffers the injury, how significant the injury is, and so on. And
if tort law is fundamentally at odds with a bedrock principle of morality, then any
view of tort as a law of wrongs is incoherent, or at least morally arbitrary, and must
be rejected.
While several scholars have argued that it is possible to re-imagine or reinterpret
tort law—or more ambitiously, all of moral philosophy—in a way that harmonizes
the two,3 there is no need to engage in that kind of mental gymnastics to respond to
the law & economic theorists’ criticism. Rather, the best answer is two-fold. First,
the scope of the problem of moral luck is really quite limited: it applies only to the
concept of moral blame. By recognizing that blame (that is, an agent’s moral praiseor blameworthiness) is distinct from other concepts that might fall under the generic
term “wrongdoing,” the traditionalist can respond with a fairly simple set of claims:
(1) the problem of moral luck is a problem for moral blame only; (2) the connection
tort law bears to morality is not on the basis of blame, but utilizes some other
conception of wrongdoing;4 (3) therefore, the problem of moral luck does not apply
1
Here I am thinking of Jules Coleman, John Goldberg, Stephen Perry, Ernest Weinrib,
and Benjamin Zipursky, among others.
2

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Guido Calabresi, and Richard Posner come to mind.

3

E.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1164-69 (2007). Tony Honoré outlines a similar view when he
suggests that the policy justifications for holding a person responsible for a bad outcome—he
focuses on the interest in maximizing utility and avoiding problems of proof—might justify
our reconceptualizing the term “fault” to include situations where a person couldn’t have done
otherwise. TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 18–21 (1999).
4

Not all traditionalists can make this move, of course: there are some who are firmly
committed to the connection between tort and moral blame. See infra Section IV.A.
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to tort law. The second answer is to recognize that the use of the problem of moral
luck by the law & economic theorists requires the adoption of a number of
controversial views in the realm of normative ethics. In particular, utilizing this
critique would require us to give up on much of our everyday intuitions about moral
responsibility and blame. While some scholars may be perfectly happy to make this
move, these unintended consequences must be recognized, articulated, and defended
before the law & economic theorists can get any traction in their critique.
Two introductory points: First, I am not going to attempt to defend a particular
traditionalist view of tort law wholesale—indeed, the very point of the argument laid
out above is that it is open to any non-blame-based view of wrongdoing. Rather, I
will only be responding to the problem of moral luck, a specific charge leveled
against traditionalism, albeit usually in an inchoate form. However, the response to
this objection clarifies an issue that I believe has been overlooked by a number of
academics when they do make these more ambitious arguments. As a result, this
Article makes two contributions to the debate: it both engages with a specific debate
in tort theory and, perhaps more importantly, brings out and analyzes an intuition
many people have but rarely articulate in a precise manner.
Second, in Part IV of this Article, I highlight the difference between moral blame
and moral obligation. I do so not because I think the traditionalist view must be
concerned with one or the other—as Section IV.A demonstrates, there are a number
traditionalist theories that don’t have much to do with either—but as a way to bring
out the contours of the problem of moral luck. While I am quite sympathetic to the
obligations-based view of tort that I discuss below, in this piece I bring it up only to
make the smaller point that any non-blame-based view of tort straightforwardly
avoids the problem of moral luck.
Part II of this Article provides the background: Section II.A sets up the debate
between the traditionalists and the law & economic theorists, while Section II.B
discusses the problem of moral luck as it has been articulated by moral philosophers.
Section II.C explains the law & economic theorists’ use of moral luck as a critique of
traditionalism. Part III looks critically at the problem of moral luck. Section III.A
sets out the distinction between moral obligation and blame, commonly discussed in
philosophy, to demonstrate that the term “wrongdoing” is actually open to a variety
of different interpretations. Section III.B argues that if moral luck poses a problem
at all, it is one for our understanding of blame only, and not for all concepts that fit
under the heading “wrongdoing.” Part IV brings Part III’s conclusions to bear on the
theory of tort law. Section IV.A first provides some background on the variety of
flavors traditionalism comes in; Section IV.B delves more deeply into one of these
sub-views, the obligations-based theory of tort, to demonstrate the limited reach
moral luck has on traditionalism; and Section IV.C analyzes just what the law &
economic theorists have gotten wrong in their luck-based criticisms of
traditionalism. Finally, Part V considers a surprising and unintended outcome that
falls out of the law & economic theorists’ use of moral luck: following the moral
luck objection to its logical end requires us to take on controversial commitments in
the realm of moral philosophy, making it that much harder to accept the idea that
moral luck really is a legitimate objection to traditionalism.
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THE BACKGROUND

A. Wrongs or Losses?
Let us begin by giving a brief account of the difference between what I have
called the traditionalists and the law & economic theorists. Traditionalists believe
that tort is “a law of wrongs and redress,” where the term “wrongs” is meant in the
moral sense.5 Tort law is concerned with wrongs—moral wrongs—the violation of
which creates an obligation in the tortfeasor to compensate the victim for her injury.
The most prominent defender of this view, Ernest Weinrib, argues that for a victim
to be able to recover in tort, her injury “must be something . . . that ranks as the
embodiment of a right.”6 If the tortfeasor violates a right of the victim, then he is
obligated to compensate her for the injury caused. This obligation arises out of the
violation of the right: “With the materialization of wrongful injury, the only way the
defendant can discharge his or her obligation respecting the plaintiff’s right is to
undo the effects of the breach of duty.”7 Or again, “[t]he plaintiff’s suffering of a[n]
unjust loss is the foundation of his or her claim against the person who has inflicted
that loss.”8 There are, in other words, certain obligations that we owe to each other,
and if I violate one of these duties and injure you, then I am obligated to fix the
injury that I’ve caused.
“Traditionalism” is actually a broad term that captures a number of competing
theories. Most traditionalists adhere to the thought that there are certain conditions
where A, having causally contributed to B’s loss, owes a duty to compensate B for
the injury suffered, and that B has a correlative right to recover from A. At this point
however, traditionalism breaks down into a series of competing sub-views. I give a
fuller account of the different theories that fall under the term “traditionalism” in
Section IV.A below.
In contrast, the law & economic theorists believe that tort law isn’t about the
redress of moral wrongs, but rather the efficient allocation of certain kinds of losses.
“Tort is [most] accurately and usefully understood as a scheme by which
government, for reasons of policy or principle, shifts or allocates losses initially born
by the unfortunate victim who has suffered . . . .”9 Those who take this approach—
most notably Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi—believe that the government
ought to impose the costs of accidents in the manner that most efficiently reduces
those costs. Posner’s “economic meaning of negligence” holds that “the dominant
function of the fault system is to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring
about, at least approximately, the efficient—the cost-justified—level of accidents
and safety.”10 Similarly, then-Professor Calabresi wrote, “I take it as given that the
principle functions of ‘accident law’ [that is, tort law] are to compensate victims and
reduce accident costs . . . The notion that accident law’s role is punishment of
5

Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 1138.

6

ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 134 (1995).

7

Id. at 135.

8

Id. at 144.

9

Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 1148.

10

Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972); see also
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).
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wrongdoers cannot be taken seriously.”11 Though the law & economics approach
was put forward only a few decades ago, it has attracted a great deal of attention and
become the dominant theory of tort law.12 Weinrib nicely highlights the difference
between this approach and the traditionalist view when he argues that “[i]n bringing
an action, the plaintiff does not step forward as the representative of the public
interest in economic efficiency or in any other condition of general welfare. The
plaintiff sues literally in his or her own right as the victim of the defendant’s unjust
act.”13
All that being said, there is a third possible interpretation of tort law, one that
does not easily fall into either the traditionalist or law & economic theorist camp.
This alternative view goes along with the law & economic theorists in arguing that
tort is about efficient reduction of some variable, but it is concerned with minimizing
violations of rights, rather than the costs of accidents.14 Whether or not one finds
this alternative compelling, this “rights maximizing” view can be grouped with the
anti-traditionalists for purposes of this Article: it takes issue with the idea that tort
law is about compensation for wrongful losses, and as such can, if a rightsmaximizing theorist were so inclined, make use of the problem of moral luck to
attack the traditionalist position in the same manner as a law & economic theorist.
B. The Problem of Moral Luck
The problem of moral luck was most clearly articulated and systematized at a
symposium with Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams,15 though the issue had been
kicking around in one form or another for millennia. Generally speaking, the
situations that produce moral luck are those where the way we evaluate an agent
depends at least in part on factors which are outside of the agent’s control—factors
which are, at least with respect to the agent, entirely a matter of luck. According to
Nagel, “[w]here a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors
beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral
judgment, it can be called moral luck.”16 Moral luck is just the contradiction
between two deeply felt intuitions we have about morality: our belief that we are
only responsible for that which is under our control (the “control principle”), and our
everyday intuitions where we make moral judgments on the basis of factors that are
entirely outside the person’s control. Let us take each in turn.
11

Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713 (1965); see also Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
12
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 530 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The
tort system is premised on the assumption that the imposition of liability encourages actors to
prevent any injury whose expected cost exceeds the cost of prevention.”).
13

WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 143.

14

E.g., Gregory Keating, Strict Liability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck, 2 J. ETHICS &
SOCIAL PHIL. 1, 4 (2006), available at
http://www.jesp.org/PDF/StrictLiability_FinalVersion.pdf.
15

Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 57 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993); Bernard
Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK, supra, at 35.
16

Nagel, supra note 15, at 59.
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The control principle has been formulated in a number of ways, and they all tend
to revolve around nebulous phrases like “one cannot . . . be subject to luck as far as
one’s moral worth is concerned,”17 morality must only judge what is “in the self”18
or—more tautologically—that people “cannot be morally assessed for what is not
their fault.”19 In any case, the underlying intuition is fairly simple: you cannot be
responsible for something you cannot control. I’m not blamed for the thunderstorm
sweeping the Midwest, nor for the fact that Dennis Rader committed ten murders.
Why? Because there isn’t a thing I can or could have done to affect either outcome.
True, it is sometimes difficult to determine what is in fact “under my control.” I
probably do have control over whether I raise my hand, and probably don’t over the
path of the Earth relative to the Sun. But there are lots of interesting middle cases:
can I control my seemingly overwhelming desire to eat a piece of chocolate cake,
and forego desert? How about my pathological desire to commit arson? Or my
addiction to painkillers? The problem of moral luck doesn’t turn on how we answer
these questions. The point is that, whatever one’s definition of “under your control”
is, if some feature of the world doesn’t fall under that description, you’re not
responsible for it.
On the other hand, we have a lot of very basic intuitions that push against the
control principle. These intuitions come in three flavors. The most famous example,
falling under Nagel’s category of “consequential luck,” involves two drivers.20 Sally
and Sue both drive down the same road at the same time of day in the same car
under the same conditions at the same rate of speed—twenty-five miles per hour
over the limit. Sally makes it to her destination on time, but Sue fares quite a bit
worse: out of the blue, a small child darts into the road and due to her excessive
speed, Sue is unable to stop, and hits and kills the child. Sally, we think, did
something wrong (she shouldn’t have sped so fast), but not anything particularly
terrible. Sue’s actions, on the other hand, tend to intuitively be considered
significantly more egregious: she’s committed a homicide and is subject to
significant legal punishment and a large recovery in tort; not only that, but there is
also an intuition that she’s done something worse than Sally, and ought to be blamed
for her actions in a way that differs from Sally. But Sally and Sue performed exactly
the same actions with exactly the same intention under exactly the same
circumstances; Sally disregarded the same level of risk Sue did in choosing to drive
faster than the speed limit. It was purely a matter of luck—and entirely outside of
either driver’s control—that a child leapt out in front of Sue’s car, but not Sally’s.
The consequences of our actions aren’t the only realm in which the problem of
moral luck appears. The same problem arises with regard to the circumstances we
find ourselves in—in Nagel’s parlance, “circumstantial luck.”21 It isn’t up to me
whether someone I really dislike comes around when I’m in a bad mood, or whether
I am offered a substantial amount of money to write another person’s paper, or even
how often my significant other asks me what I think of her new clothes. In each of
17

Daniel Statman, Introduction, in MORAL LUCK, supra note 15, at 1.

18

Williams, supra note 15, at 35.

19

Nagel, supra note 15, at 58.

20

Id. This hypothetical comes from Nagel’s discussion in that work.

21

Id. at 60.
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these cases, I am placed in a situation where I am tempted to do something wrong—
to be cross with another person, to cheat, or to lie. If I make the wrong decision,
then barring some excuse or justification for my action, I’m to blame; but at the
same time, there is a sense in which I was unfortunate in having to face the situation
in the first place. Another person, someone who would have made exactly the same
bad choice, may never face the temptation to do wrong, and therefore may never be
held responsible for the kinds of things that I am to blame for.
Finally, constitutive luck also plays a significant role in our everyday lives.
There are things about me—my attitudes, desires, abilities, and so on—that I can’t
do anything about. It is what Nagel refers to as “the kind of person you are . . . your
inclinations, capacities and temperament.”22 I cannot, for example, change the fact
that I am particularly clumsy or prone to very strong desires to do dangerous things.
But if I do something clumsy and cause some kind of harm as a result, then I am to
blame for that consequence, whether or not I could have done any differently.
As I mentioned above, what we have are competing intuitions: the control
principle, on the one hand, and the fact that consequential, circumstantial, and
constitutive luck seem to play a large role in our everyday moral evaluations, on the
other. As a matter of formal logic, then, there are three ways we can respond to our
quandary. We can accept the fact that luck plays a role in our moral evaluations and
give up on or restrict the control principle.23 Alternatively, we can instead claim that
despite appearances, there isn’t actually any such thing as moral luck and modify our
everyday intuitions about consequential, circumstantial, and constitutive luck to
reflect this fact.24 Finally, we might say that the problem is so intractable that there
is no way to adequately deal with it, and consequently give up on the notion of moral
blame altogether.25
C. Moral Luck and Tort Law
The application of the problem of moral luck to the traditionalist view of tort law
is fairly straightforward. It is a fundamental principle of morality that you can only
22

Nagel, supra note 15, at 60.

23

“There can be no such thing as a coherent general objection to our being exposed to
moral luck. Attempts to explicate such an objection are an object lesson in the hazards of
argumentative overkill.” John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in
RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY 111, 127 (Peter Crane & John Gardner, eds. 2001). This
argument is further developed in John Gardner, The Wrongdoing that Gets Results, 18
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 53 (2004).
24

See Daniel Statman, Introduction, in MORAL LUCK, supra note 15, at 18-21.
Interestingly, the Wikipedia entry on moral luck casts, implicitly and without defense, a strong
vote in favor of this approach with its introductory statement, “Moral luck describes
circumstances whereby a moral agent is assigned moral blame or praise for an action or its
consequences even though it is clear that said agent did not have full control over either the
action or its consequences.” WIKIPEDIA, Moral Luck, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_luck
(last visited Nov. 18, 2010) (emphasis added).
25
E.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Walter Kaufman, trans.
1967) (“In this psychical cruelty there resides a madness of the will which is absolutely
unexampled: the will of man to find himself guilty and reprehensible to a degree that can
never be atoned for; his will to think himself punished without any possibility of the
punishment becoming equal to the guilt . . . ”).
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be held blameworthy for that which is under your control. But in tort law, whether
and how much a victim ever recovers is entirely dependent on things that are outside
of the tortfeasor’s and the victim’s control. Tort law instantiates all three types of
moral luck discussed above—constitutive, consequential, and circumstantial.
Richard Posner famously rejects the view of negligence as “moral or moralist”
because “The morality of the fault system is very different from that of everyday life.
Negligence is an objective standard. A man may be adjudged negligent though he
did his best to avoid an accident and just happens to be clumsier than average.”26
To put the matter in more theoretical terms, Posner is pointing to what Nagel called
constitutive luck.27 Tort law doesn’t really care, for the most part, whether you’re
actually able to adhere to your legal duties.28 Negligence is an objective standard,
and a defendant coming in to court to argue that though he acted unreasonably, he
couldn’t have done otherwise, isn’t going to get anywhere. In a similar vein, Oliver
Wendell Holmes noted, “The law considers . . . what would be blameworthy in the
average man . . . and determines liability by that. If we fall below the level in those
gifts, it is our misfortune . . . .”29
Consequential luck also runs rampant throughout tort law. Take the well-known
eggshell skull rule. In Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., for example, the plaintiff,
William Smith, sued his defendant-employer after he “sustained a burn on his lip
from a spattering of molten metal” because his employer did not provide adequate
safeguards to prevent injury. While the injury was relatively slight—only Smith’s
lip was burned—the wound never healed, and he eventually developed cancer at the
point of the burn, which led to his death.30 The court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the amount of damages was all out of proportion to the degree of fault,
finding that “a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him.”31 An admittedly culpable
tortfeasor may find himself on the hook to compensate for massive loss, a loss
disproportionate to the blameworthiness of his conduct, though he had no way of
knowing—or controlling—the degree of injury caused by his negligent action.32
Finally, the same is true of circumstantial luck, which also appears throughout
tort law. Consider the tortfeasor who engaged in negligent conduct that proximately
resulted in serious harm, but knows full well that there are other people who, if put
in his situation, would have committed exactly the same tort. True, the tortfeasor
may be obligated to pay back the losses he caused, but what of all the would-be
26

Posner, supra note 10, at 31.

27

Nagel, supra note 15, at 60. Goldberg and Zipursky discuss this type of luck under the
heading of “compliance luck,” though the two terms are not perfectly interchangeable.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 1144.
28

E.g., James Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Moral Blameworthiness
and Liability for Negligence, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 343, 352–56 (2004). This is particularly
apparent in the content of strict liability. E.g., id. at 356–58.
29

OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).

30

Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., 2 Q.B. 405 (1962).

31

Id.; see also Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891).

32

E.g., Goudkamp, supra note 28, at 364–65 (discussing the “proportionality principle”).
For a more detailed discussion of this objection to tort, see my discussion of Waldron’s work
in Section IV.C.
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tortfeasors who get off scot-free because they had the good fortune not to be faced
with those circumstances in the first place? It was entirely out of either individual’s
control whether he would be faced with a difficult dilemma, and though both would
have engaged in exactly the same wrongful conduct, only one is held liable.
Luck is interwoven throughout every fiber of tort law, and so is at odds with an
axiom of morality. Indeed, the point has been made many times over in the tort
theory literature.33 Tort law thus cannot possibly be understood to incorporate a
normative view of human behavior. “The conduct which tort law identifies as
wrongful is sufficiently removed from standard moral conceptions of wrongdoing
that tort cannot plausibly be what it appears to be, namely, law that empowers
victims of wrongs to obtain redress from wrongdoers.”34
III.

MORAL LUCK REVISITED

In this Part, I lay out the distinction between moral blame and obligation and go
on to apply that analysis to the problem of moral luck in the context of moral
philosophy. In doing so, I demonstrate that the problem of moral luck is actually
rather limited in scope, applying only to blame.
A. Blame and Obligation
In this Section, I explain a distinction that will be helpful in bringing out the
contours of the problem of moral luck: the difference between moral blame and
moral obligation. The distinction isn’t particularly complicated, nor has it been
ignored in moral philosophy. Jules Coleman recognizes something like the
obligation/blame distinction when he takes up the question of how an injurer’s
conduct can be wrongful when it is measured against an objective negligence
standard (a form of constitutive luck, discussed in Section II.B, supra). “In what
sense,” asks Coleman, “can an injurer who does the best he can, but fails
nevertheless to act as would have a reasonable person, be said to have acted
wrongfully?”35 His answer lies in drawing a distinction between what he calls “fault
in the doing” and “fault in the doer.”36 Coleman asserts that the standard of tort law
is fault in the doing.
The failure to abide by the relevant norms of conduct is enough to render
the action a form of wrongdoing . . . and the losses that result wrongful . .
. even if it is inadequate to render the agent a culpable wrongdoer,
someone who would be worthy of blame, sanction or punishment.37

33
See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation, and Moral
Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 347, 361 (David G. Owen, ed.,
1995) (“The fact of causation seems too slender a reed, too weak a foundation, upon which to
base such sharp distinctions.”).
34

Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 1148.

35

COLEMAN, supra note 1.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 334. It isn’t entirely clear what precisely the difference is between fault in the
doing and fault in the doer. While Coleman spends a great deal of time discussing what
constitutes a wrong and a wrongdoing, he doesn’t say whether either instantiates a moralsbased view. This analysis appears to be in line with the way Stephen Perry distinguishes
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The point is easily stated: blame deals with the degree to which an agent is praise- or
blameworthy for her conduct; it is concerned with the agent’s culpability. Moral
obligation has to do with what morality requires agents to do – what we might think
of as the content of the moral law. Horder refers to the Aristotelian distinction
between “normative” and “ascriptive” rules, where normative rules “concern what
we ought (not) to do or are (not) permitted to do,” while ascriptive rules “concern the
conditions in which we are (not) to be blamed for breach of a normative rule.”38 To
be sure, this explanation leaves quite a bit unanswered: there is wide disagreement
about the content of our moral duties, and the term “blame” is particularly difficult to
define. But I want to push on the basic intuition that there is something different
about what we’re obligated to do and what we’re to blame for. In most cases, when
a person does something she was under a moral obligation not to do – conduct which
we would quite easily describe as “wrongful” – we blame her for what she has done.
In the “normal” or “everyday” case, a person’s doing something wrong is good
reason to think that she is to blame. That is not to say, however, that one necessarily
follows as a result of the other, and indeed, the two are not perfectly coextensive. As
T.M. Scanlon noted, “[W]rongness and blame can come apart.”39 The mere fact that
a person has not lived up to her moral duties doesn’t end the inquiry into whether or
not she is to blame for that violation. This is how we make sense of intuitions of the
form, “Well of course it was wrong of her to yell at her friend; but it wasn’t her fault
– her grandmother died just yesterday and was so distraught.”40 There are cases, in
other words, where a person did something wrong – she violated a moral duty – but
she is not to blame for her wrongful conduct.41
*

*

*

between two general types of corrective justice theories of tort law, with Coleman standing
(mostly) alone in holding that the obligation to compensate for a wrongful loss is a “general
social responsibility” not specific to the tortfeasor, and “involving more widespread reasons
for action.” Stephen R. Perry, Corrective Justice & Formalism: The Care One Owes One’s
Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 450 (1992).
38

Jeremy Horder, Can the Law Do Without the Reasonable Person?, 55 U.
TORONTO L.J. 253, 264 (2005); see also Peter Westen, Individualizing the
Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 140 (2008) (discussing
the distinction between “unlawful conduct” and “culpability”).
39

T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 124 (2008).

40

P.F. Strawson’s extraordinarily influential work Freedom and Resentment develops this

view:
If someone treads on my hand accidentally, while trying to help me, the pain may be
no less acute than if he treads on it in contemptuous disregard of my existence or with
a malevolent wish to injure me. But I shall generally feel in the second case a kind and
degree of resentment that I shall not feel in the first.
P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 5
(1974).
41

The two might also come apart in exactly the opposite way, where we blame someone
even though she did not do anything wrong. SCANLON, supra note 39, at 124.
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Considering a counterargument to the obligation/blame distinction will help to
illuminate the point. Someone might argue that when we refrain from blaming the
person who just lost her grandmother, we aren’t saying that what she did was
wrongful, but it was understandable that she did it. The fact that her grandmother’s
death made her so distraught makes the conduct not wrongful; that is, she did not
breach any duty. Our moral obligation isn’t just “do not yell at your friends,” but
rather, “do not yell at your friends unless you are seriously distraught over the death
of a loved one.” There isn’t any real distinction between obligation and blame: what
we are morally obligated to do are just those things that we would be blamed for if
we did not do them.
There are three reasons why this “coextensivist” view cannot be a plausible
account of moral obligation and blame. First, it does not accurately capture the way
we articulate our moral obligations. God said, “Thou shalt not kill,” not “Thou shall
not kill unless you do not realize that your conduct might result in a death, or you are
acting in self defense, or you are acting in defense of others, or you are acting on the
basis of necessity because a great many people would die otherwise, or you are a
soldier fighting in a just war and your victim is a part of the force you are fighting
against . . .” and on and on. We do not think of the content of our moral obligations
to be a prohibition of some kind of conduct followed by a very long (and perhaps
infinite) set of disjuncts that act as exceptions to the prohibition.
Moreover, if we do not buy into the obligation/blame distinction, we are at a loss
in explaining the concept of excuse.42 Roughly speaking, a person has an excuse
when she did something that was wrong, but isn’t blamed for her wrongful conduct
because of one reason or another: “[A] defense of excuse . . . does not make legal
and proper conduct which ordinarily would result in criminal liability; instead, it
openly recognizes the criminality of the conduct but excuses it . . . .”43 So the
distraught person who yells at her friends but does so because her grandmother just
died has an excuse: her conduct was wrongful, but we have a reason to overlook her
failing and not hold her accountable for it. Excuse plays an important role in
criminal law,44 and it tracks well with our everyday beliefs about morality. But under
the coextensivist view, there is no such thing as an excuse: all conduct is either
wrongful or it is not, and “excuses” are nothing more than particular disjuncts that
appear in a proper formulation of our moral duties.
42
For the same reasons, the coextensivist view is also at a loss to explain the concept of
justification, if one takes “justification” to mean cases where there is some reason that makes
conduct that appears to be wrongful actually not wrongful (perfect self-defense and necessity
in criminal law, for example, are traditionally viewed as justifications). CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 515 (John Kaplan et al., eds. 2008). However, because there is disagreement
about what constitutes a justification—indeed, many commentators do not believe there is a
rigid line between justification and excuse, see, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART I, at 2-4 (1985)—I do not take up the issue here. For
more on this point, see Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41
MCGILL L. J. 91, 128-29 (1995).
43

State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814 (N.D. 1983). Or as an alternative formulation,
“[T]o say that someone’s conduct is ‘excused’ ordinarily connotes that the conduct is thought
to be undesirable but that for some reason the actor is not to be blamed for it.” CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 42.
44

See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 42–43.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012

11

68

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:57

Third and finally, the things that we consider in deciding whether a particular act
is wrong are not the same set of things we consider in deciding whether someone
should be blameworthy for engaging in wrongful conduct. For example, we are
obligated not to kill. While there may not be widespread agreement about what
exactly makes killing wrong, there are certain plausible candidates: killing decreases
overall utility or preference satisfaction; it isn’t conducive to human flourishing; it is
a violation of the categorical imperative; it deprives the victim of a future life like
ours. Similarly, while not everyone agrees what factors are relevant in assessing
whether we should blame someone who kills, it plausibly has something to do with
whether the person was insane, whether she was aware of what she was doing at the
time, whether she was acting in self defense or defense of others, and so on. But this
goes to show that what makes the conduct of killing wrongful is not the same thing
that justifies our blaming someone who does kill. Even if it were true that the set of
things which we are obligated not to do is perfectly coextensive with the set of
things we are blameworthy for, that fact can’t be deduced by formal logic – there
would have to be some analytical connection, some argument, about why it is that
conduct which is wrongful is, and is always, blameworthy.
B. What Is Moral Luck a Problem for?
The distinction between blame and obligation helps us to recognize that the
problem of moral luck is really a problem for blame, but not for obligation, or, for
that matter, anything else that might fall under the term “wrongdoing.” The
explication of moral luck in Section I.B gives us a good starting point: the control
principle says that agents are only responsible – in the sense of being blameworthy –
for that which is under their control; it does not saying anything about what agents
are obligated to do. The concern that moral luck raises does not alter or push up
against any of these moral obligations. Let’s go back to the example of Sally and
Sue, the two drivers. The concern was that we hold Sue more blameworthy than
Sally, even though the relevant difference between Sally and Sue was a factor
entirely outside of either agent’s control. This concern had nothing to do with
Sally’s or Sue’s moral obligations: both had the same duty to operate their vehicles
in a safe manner, and that obligation was independent of whether Sally or Sue had
any control over whether a child ran out onto the road. In other words, the fact that
Sally and Sue did not have complete control over the consequences that resulted
from their actions (that is, that consequential luck was involved) does not tell us
anything about what Sally and Sue were obligated to do.
Consider a few theories in normative ethics. Preference utilitarianism holds that
an agent is obligated to do just that which maximizes aggregate preference
satisfaction among the relevant class of persons.45 Kantian ethics requires that we
only act on a maxim that we can will to be a universal law, or alternatively, that we
always treat moral agents as ends, but never as means.46 Virtue ethics tells us to
45

E.g., PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1993).

46

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 79 (Mary J. Gregor
ed., trans., Cambridge University Press 1996) (“Now I say that the human being and in
general every rational being exists as an end in itself.”); see also CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD,
CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 106 (1996). There are, depending on how one counts, one or
two additional formulations of Kant’s categorical imperative, but that is not relevant to the
argument being presented here.
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engage in conduct that leads to human flourishing.47 Each of these is a theory about
the content of our moral obligations. But if someone who is sympathetic to the law
& economic theorists’ use of moral luck were to object to any of these theories by
arguing that it is arbitrary, or merely a matter of luck, whether a person in a given
situation actually complies with her moral obligations, that would simply be
nonresponsive to the prior question of what those moral obligations are—the
argument is a non sequitur, having no bearing on the point at hand. And that is just
because theories about our obligations are distinct from those about when and why
we are blameworthy or praiseworthy.
There is one important caveat to the claim that moral luck does not pose any kind
of problem for our view of moral blame. Recall the discussion of the three ways in
which a person might respond to the problem of moral luck.48 One of those three
ways is to throw up our hands, say there is no adequate way to respond, and give up
on the notion of moral blame altogether. In that case, moral luck would seem to
pose a significant problem to our understanding of moral obligation: if we are giving
up on an agent’s being praiseworthy or blameworthy, how can we make sense of the
idea that we’re morally obligated to do anything? What would it mean to say that
moral agents have obligations if they are never held accountable for failing to live up
to them? I think this is a fair point, as far as it goes: if moral luck really is so
intractable that there is no coherent view of blame, it might very well not make much
sense to talk about our moral obligations.49 At the same time, as I discuss below in
the context of tort law,50 making that move requires us to give up on too much of our
most basic beliefs. It is a price, I think, that we are unwilling to pay.
IV. TORT LAW REVISITED
Having elaborated on the obligation/blame distinction and how it relates to the
problem of moral luck, I now turn to the tort law. Moral luck doesn’t get much
traction against the traditionalist view. In Section IV.A, I provide some background
on traditionalism, offering a brief account of some of its variations. In Section IV.B,
I focus in on one variant—the obligations-based view—and use it as a kind of case
study to demonstrate the severely limited reach moral luck actually has on
traditionalism. Finally, in Section IV.C, I bring out what it is the law & economic
theorists have gotten wrong in their use of moral luck.
A. Variants on Traditionalism
The term “traditionalism” isn’t quite as univocal as one might think. It captures a
number of divergent theories that can only be loosely grouped under the same term.
In giving this brief overview, I borrow heavily from Stephen Perry’s taxonomy.51
47
E.g., VIRTUE ETHICS (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003); Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 515 (David Copp ed., 2006).
48

See supra Section II.B; see also infra Section IV.B.

49
I should say that while this is a plausible argument, it is by no means easy or obvious.
One could coherently argue that even though we are never to blame, there still is a moral law
which imparts obligations on us.
50
51

See infra Section IV.B.
Perry, supra note 37, at 449.
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Perry recognizes two broad categories that fall under my use of the term
“traditionalism”: the first holds that the purpose of any theory of corrective justice is
to annul wrongful gains or losses. Importantly, the responsibility to annul does not
belong to the tortfeasor alone, but is a social obligation.52 Jules Coleman, the most
prominent defender of this type of theory, argues that while a wrongful loss does
give rise to an obligation to repair, that obligation does not belong to the tortfeasor
exclusively: “[I]t is a general social responsibility involving more widespread
reasons for action.”53 The second, and dominant, sub-category of traditionalism
regards corrective justice as “involving a limited moral relationship that holds only
between the injurer and victim.”54 In certain situations, a person who causes
another’s injury is obligated to compensate the victim for that injury. The trick, of
course, is to define what the “certain situations” are that give rise to this kind of
obligation. To answer this question, Perry identifies three sub-sub-theories: the
restitution theory, the localized distributive justice theory, and the volitionist theory.
The restitution theory says that “A has come into possession of something that
belongs to B and hence must give it back.”55 While Perry initially grounds the
argument in an Aristotelian view of corrective justice,56 he recognizes that modern
scholars have also taken this approach. Richard Epstein, for example, argues for a
strikingly strong connection between takings in property law and destruction or
injury in tort law, asserting that “torts themselves are a sub-class of takings.”57
Under the localized distributive justice theory, A bears a causal connection to B’s
loss and, as between the two of them, it is better that A bear the loss. It comes in two
forms.58 The strict liability view (which Perry offers a rather devastating critique
of59) says that it is the fact that A acted which provides the reason to shift the loss to
B; under the fault-based view, it is that A acted wrongfully that grounds the
obligation to compensate: as between a faulty injurer and faultless victim, it is better
that the victim not bear the loss.60 Perry places Tony Honoré firmly in this camp,

52

Id. at 449-50.

53
Id. at 450; JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 324 (1992); Coleman & Ripstein,
supra note 41 (arguing that the proper concern of corrective justice is to answer the question,
“Who owns which of life’s misfortunes?”).
54

Perry, supra note 37, at 450.

55

Id. at 451.

56

Id. at 452-55.

57

Id. at 458-59; see also RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
38 (1985).

OF EMINENT DOMAIN
58

Perry, supra note 37, at 461, 467.

59

Id. at 463-64.

60

Id. at 467-68. Perry critiques this view by arguing that it is arbitrary to “localize” its
scope so that it only applies to the victim and the alleged tortfeasor. Carried to its logical end,
the fault-based redistributivist view is not localized at all, but requires that “social burdens . . .
be distributed among persons in accordance with the degree to which they have exhibited
moral deficiency or shortcoming.” Id. at 471-72. The criticism is not particularly persuasive;
the argument is that there is no principled reason to limit application of the redistribution of
harm to the victim and the tortfeasor. However, it is only arbitrary if we concede Perry’s claim
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recognizing that Honoré’s argument depends on the “moral deficiency or
shortcoming” of A.61 For this reason it is clear that Honoré is wedded to a blamebased conception of traditionalism: In Responsibility and Fault, Honoré tackles the
problem of moral luck head-on, recognizing that the control principle is at odds with
the objective standard of negligence.62 He considers possible justifications for
imposing liability in these kinds of cases that sound in policy arguments, concerns
about availability of proof, theories of promising, and the like.63 Ultimately finding
these explanations unsatisfactory, Honoré constructs a theory of tort as a “betting
system” where the system is fair because it “entail[s] that when we bear the risk of
bad luck we also benefit if our luck is good”64 – we take the good with the bad.
“The person concerned, though he cannot be sure what the outcome of his action will
be, has chosen to act in the knowledge that he will be credited or debited with
whatever it turns out to be.”65
Finally, the volitionist theory grounds the obligation to compensate in the fact
that A engaged in voluntary action. Under the strict-liability volitionist view, A is
responsible to B just because all people are responsible for the proximate effects of
their voluntary actions, whether good or bad; under fault-based volitionism, A’s
engaging voluntarily in wrongful action imparts on A an obligation to compensate.66
Goldberg and Zipursky are probably best understood as taking a fault-based
volitional view, where the term “fault” has something to do with moral blame.67 In
their article, they consider the moral luck objection, recognize the intuitive pull of
the argument that it is “indefensible to treat someone who does his best to be careful
as having acted in a wrongful manner,”68 and move on “to consider how much of a
notion of wrongdoing is left when we are dealing with a standard . . . that does not
assess behavior in terms of or with sensitivity to incompetencies . . . .”69 The fact
that Goldberg and Zipursky think of moral luck as getting traction against the notion
that the theory should be expanded to take into account the moral worth of actions that did not
causally contribute to the injury at issue. Id.
61

Id. at 472-73.

62

TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 18 (1999).

63

Id. at 18-22.

64

Id. at 24.

65

Id. at 31. This argument is very close to Jeremy Waldron’s adaptation of David Lewis’s
“penal lottery.” See infra Section IV.C. Importantly, this lottery concept grapples only with
consequential luck, and does not provide an answer to the concerns we have with respect to
circumstantial or constitutive luck: there isn’t a meaningful sense in which we choose to bet
with respect to the circumstances we find ourselves in or the kind of characteristics that we
have.
66

Perry, supra note 37, at 474-75.

67

However, I think the paper is frustratingly ambiguous on this point, and the pair could
plausibly be placed under the fault-based localized distributive justice view as well. Their
theory clearly depends on the wrongfulness of A’s conduct, but they do not discuss what the
mechanism is that makes A’s wrongful conduct give rise to an obligation to repair.
68

Goldberg and Zipursky, supra note 3, at 1153.

69

Id. at 1154.
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of “wrongs” suggests they understand the term to refer to blame, but the point is
never clearly articulated. The argument seems to be that while tort law is not exactly
the same as our intuitive understanding of wrongdoing – where “wrongdoing” here
probably, but not necessarily, means blameworthy conduct – it is “close enough” to
still be considered a wrong: “These five features are quite enough to earn legal
negligence, and torts more generally, the status of wrongs.”70
Perry, for his part, finds that these theories all come up short in one way or
another. He advocates instead for a theory where “the localized distributive
argument . . . and the agency-oriented understanding of outcome-responsibility [the
strict-liability volitionist theory] are complementary.”71 A person’s voluntary action
which proximately causes a loss entails that she is “outcome responsible” for that
loss, and that means that she bears a special relationship to that loss – it is in some
sense hers (the strict liability volitionist argument). And among those people who
have this kind of a normatively significant connection to a loss, it is morally
preferable that the person who acted wrongfully bear it (the distributive argument).72
B. The Obligations-Based View
In this Section, I set out a traditionalist theory of tort law which makes use of the
obligation/blame distinction discussed in Section III.A. I do so not to assert that this
particular theory is correct, but as a means to bring out just how narrow moral luck’s
application is to traditionalist views of tort law.
The distinction between moral blame and obligation discussed above permits the
traditionalist to neatly avoid the problem of moral luck in tort law by constructing an
obligations-based theory. The argument is quite simple: moral luck, if it is a
problem at all, is one for our understanding of blame, not obligation. Traditionalism
connects tort law to morality via moral obligation, not blame. Therefore, moral luck
gets no traction against the theory.
The key move in this argument is, of course, that the traditionalist view “links
up” to morality on the level of moral obligation, rather than blame. To make the
proposal clearer, let us consider an alternative theory, the obligations-based view,
which holds that the connection between tort law and morality is on the basis of
moral obligation: when we are deciding what kinds of actions constitute tortious
conduct, this approach argues, we should look to normative ethics. This is not to say
that the set of our moral obligations is coextensive with the set of our duties under
the tort law; they can and do come apart in significant ways. But in the same way
that the criminal law bears a substantial connection to morally blameworthy conduct,

70
Id. at 1156. Zipursky has also proffered a descriptive account of tort law as a model of
“civil recourse,” where tort is interpreted as a “civilized transformation” of an instinct for
retributive justice. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998). A retributive justice-based account of tort would, of course,
make use of moral blame.
71

Perry, supra note 37, at 497.

72

Id. at 499. While I am generally sympathetic to Perry’s theory, I am, for the reasons
give above, not sure that the strict liability volitionist argument is necessary to limit the scope
of the localized redistributive theory, and think a plausible claim can be made that localized
distributivism taken alone can give rise to a tortfeasor’s obligation to repair the victim’s loss.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss1/3

16

2012]

TORT, MORAL LUCK, AND BLAME

73

but does not capture all instances where an agent is blameworthy,73 so tort bears a
substantial connection to moral obligation. Tort law is not so much a law of wrongs
as it is a law of wrongdoing which captures, in some significant way, the kind of
conduct that we as moral agents are and are not permitted to engage in. To go back
to Perry’s terminology, this falls under the second sub-class of corrective justice
theories of tort law, those that hold that a person who causes another’s injury is, in
some situations, obligated to compensate the victim for that injury. The phrase
“some situations” is filled out by making reference to our moral duties: a person has
an obligation to redress an injury when she wrongfully and proximately causes that
injury, and “wrongfully” means “acting in violation of her moral obligations.” This
obligations-based approach is ambivalent between Perry’s fault-based local
redistributive his fault-based volitionist theories. Moreover, while I classify the
obligations-based view as “fault-based,” the theory can still capture torts of strict
liability: the move is to say that our moral obligations include certain duties to
succeed (not only duties to try) a lá Gardner.74 In any case, the claim is that the
obligation to redress exists any time A violates her moral obligations and B is
proximately harmed as a result, but it does not specify the precise mechanism by
which that obligation to redress is brought about: it may be because A acted
wrongfully and as between A and B, it is preferable that A bear the loss;75 or because
A voluntarily engaged in wrongful conduct, and one of the normative incidents of
A’s wrongful conduct is that she must compensate B.76
This line of reasoning explains cases like the classic Vosburg v. Putney77 – a fact
that goes to show how little traditionalists actually give up by avoiding blame-based
views of tort. There the defendant, an eleven-year-old boy, hit the plaintiff’s shin
with his toe while the two were at school.78 The jury specifically found that the
defendant did not intend to do any harm to the plaintiff, but the court upheld the
award.79 The defendant might very well not be to blame for his conduct – he
73
There are still actions an agent could do that are blameworthy but are not criminalized:
lying, for example, or cheating on one’s partner. The reasons given in the criminal law
context for why we do not criminalize certain kinds of blameworthy conduct will also apply in
the context of torts: protection for individual autonomy, limiting the scope of the coercive
powers of government, respect for people’s privacy, etc.
74

See supra note 28 and accompanying text. This feature folds in nicely with the
arguments in favor of strict liability. Much of the justification of non-fault liability is
utilitarian in nature: by imposing strict liability, we are able to maximize utility in a way we
wouldn’t under a negligence rule. But to make that argument means that you buy into
utilitarianism, at least to some extent, as a theory of normative ethics. And that means that
your view on normative ethics is informing your approach to tort law, which looks very much
like the obligations-based view I’ve been discussing here.
75
The obligations-based theory is different than Tony Honoré’s in the way it fills out the
term “wrongfully”: while Honoré will make references to the culpability or moral worth of A,
the obligations-based view grounds the term in the violation of one’s moral obligations.
76

This approach would also part ways with Goldberg & Zipursky’s fault-based volitional
theory in the same way – in how it defines “wrongfully.”
77

Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).

78

Id. at 403.

79

Id.
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certainly had no intent and did not believe that his action would hurt his schoolmate
– but the plaintiff was entitled to recover nonetheless. “[S]uch act was a violation of
the order and decorum of the school, and necessarily unlawful.”80 Once the
plaintiff’s actions were found to be a violation of the relevant conduct-governing
rules – once it was determined that the defendant violated an obligation – that was
the end of it, with no inquiry into defendant’s culpability necessary. On any
traditionalist view that connects the tort law with moral blame however, it is much
harder to make sense of Vosburg: the fundamental characteristic of tort law – its
concern with blameworthiness – is entirely irrelevant to the case.81
*
*
*
Whether one ends up finding the obligations-based view of tort compelling, it
should be obvious by now that the same sort of response to the problem of moral
luck can be made on behalf of number of traditionalist theories. As Part III
demonstrated, moral luck does pose a problem for moral blame, but not for moral
obligation. As a result, traditionalist views that make use of blame – certainly
Honoré’s, and probably Goldberg and Zipurksy’s – have to contend directly with
moral luck and furnish a compelling answer. Theories that are grounded in moral
obligation, on the other hand, do not. And as for those theories that do not make use
of either concept (here I am thinking primarily of Richard Epstein’s restitution
theory and Perry’s combination of outcome responsibility and fault-based localized
distributive justice), it would depend on the specifics of the theory. For Perry in
particular, it depends on what he means when he says a person has “a normatively
significant connection with [an outcome] that is capable of affecting her subsequent
reasons for action.”82 The larger point being made in this Section – in this Article –
is that the problem of moral luck, properly understood, doesn’t capture all that much
of the wide spectrum of traditionalist theories. It certainly poses a problem (though
not an insurmountable one, as I discuss in Section III.B) for those that are based on
blame, but it doesn’t get anywhere with a great many others.
C. The Law & Economics Theorists and Wrongdoing
Having run through the theory underlying the problem of moral luck and
demonstrated that it doesn’t really pose a problem for most variants of
traditionalism, we can now turn to the way this objection tends to be articulated and
see where the argument goes awry. In particular, law & economic theorists who
have used moral luck as an objection to traditionalism have consistently failed to
recognize that the term “wrongdoing” may actually refer to a number of different
concepts that are frequently conflated. That is, the standard use of moral luck by the
law & economic theorists assumes that “wrongdoing” or “morality” is a univocal
term, susceptible to only one meaning – and that this meaning is all about blame.
Judge Calabresi, for example, takes this narrow, blame-based view when he says:

80

Id. at 404 (emphasis added).

81

Indeed, if the traditionalist view really is meant to capture a view of blameworthiness,
then I think it falls prey to the straightforward critiques of the traditionalist view that are made
by Holmes, Goudkamp, Calabresi, and Posner, among dozens of others, discussed below.
82

Perry, supra note 37, at 497.
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If the time-honored, though somewhat shopworn, distinctions between
legal and moral fault and between damages and degree of culpability
which prevail in tort law do not sufficiently demonstrate this proposition
[that the purpose of tort law isn’t to punish], then surely the prevalence of
insurance priced on the basis of categories that have little to do with any
individual insured’s “goodness” or “badness” must.83
Calabresi’s argument is that tort law cannot be reasonably understood as a way of
punishing a tortfeasor for her negligent conduct, and so we must instead view tort as
a system of “nonfault liability” that seeks to reduce the cost of accidents.84 Judge
Posner’s implicit conflation of blame and obligation is even more apparent:
Characterization of the negligence standard as moral or moralistic does
not advance analysis. The morality of the fault system is very different
from that of everyday life. Negligence is an objective standard. A man
may be adjudged negligent though he did his best to avoid an accident . . .
85

As a result, he argues, we should adopt an “economic meaning of negligence,”
discounting any morally based conception of tort.86 Finally, consider an article by
James Goudkamp which begins with the assertion, “The prevailing understanding of
the tort of negligence is that notions of moral blameworthiness furnish the
philosophical foundation for liability.”87 As a defense of this claim, Goudkamp
quotes an Australian jurist who said, “‘[L]iability for negligence . . . is no doubt
based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender
must pay.’”88 In each of these three cases, the analytical move is that tort law cannot
be squared with a blame-based traditionalist view, and so we must give up on
traditionalism entirely.89 But of course, Calabresi, Posner, and Goldkamp do not
consider the distinction between blame and obligation (or between blame and any
other concept that might fit under the heading of “wrongdoing,” “fault,” or
“morality”): Calabresi only refers to moral culpability; Posner does not seem to be
aware that the terms “moral” and “moralistic” might be referring to very distinct
concepts; and Goudkamp explicitly conflates the term “wrongdoing” with
“blameworthiness.” The argument for each is that the control principle is a
foundational axiom of morality, tort law is at odds with the control principle, and
therefore there can be no coherent, morals-based theory of tort. But as I hope to
have shown, this argument misses the mark because it fails to recognize the various
concepts the word “morality” might be referring to, and therefore ignores the
possibility that there are traditionalist theories that are not subject to moral luck.
83

Calabresi, supra note 11, at 713-14.
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Id. at 713.
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Posner, supra note 10, at 31.
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Id. at 31-32 (citing Holmes, supra note 29, at 108).
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Goudkamp, supra note 28, at 343 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
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Although, as I mentioned earlier, I do find these objections to blame-based views of tort
quite devastating.
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The law & economic theorist may argue that even if the traditionalist can avoid
the technical, philosophical problem of moral luck, she will still have to contend
with something closely akin to it. For no matter how we define “wrongdoing,” the
same facts are true: whether and how much anyone recovers in tort is completely
arbitrary. A morals-based theory must pay heed to the proportionality principle (a
permutation on consequential luck): “[T]he extent of the loss a person should be
required to bear ought to be proportional to the degree of moral shortcoming that he
or she has exhibited.”90 It’s important to recognize just how strong the intuitive pull
of this response is: while philosophers can work out a complex theory to explain
why and how the violation of a duty gives rise to a corresponding obligation to
remedy the harm resulting from that violation, there’s a strong sense in which tort
law is simply unfair. Even if the point isn’t to blame someone for her breaching a
duty, people’s lives go on much differently as a result, and this calls into question
the moral justification of tort law as a legal institution. Jeremy Waldron’s important
work, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss,91 puts a sharp point on this
critique, arguing that tort law is fundamentally unfair on two fronts: (i) in the way
that it distinguishes between people who have acted negligently on the basis of
whether their negligent conduct caused a wrongful injury, and (ii) in how it can
impart massive loss onto a tortfeasor for very short, well, moments of carelessness.92
Waldron—indeed, any argument that rests its critique of tort on notions of fairness—
recognizes that such a critique relies on the idea that tort is based on notions of “just
dessert,”93 which invokes the idea of blameworthiness. In responding to those, like
me, who argue that moral blame has no place in tort, Waldron says that “[i]t would
be wrong . . . to infer that individual moral dessert, broadly construed, has no place
in our understanding or assessment of tort liability.”94 We invoke notions of fairness
in all sort of situations—arguing about whether students “deserve” their grades,
entrepreneurs their profits, and so on—and “a gaping disproportion between
individual outcomes and the morality of individual characters and conduct seems to
be a primary form of unfairness,”95 anywhere we find it.
While Waldron’s argument—as well as any argument sounding in fairness
against tort law, which necessarily makes use of retributive justice96-is well taken,
there are several lines of entry that deflate much of his concern as it relates to this
Article. To begin with, this criticism goes to the very heart of tort law: tort frames
90

Perry, supra note 37, at 470.
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Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). In this article, Waldron
considers the situations of Fate and Fortune, who both drove their cars negligently down a city
street. While Fortune is lucky insofar as no one is hurt by his conduct, Fate’s negligence
causes a massive amount of damage – $5 million.
92

Id. at 389.
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Id. at 390.
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Id.
Id. at 391.
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In this Section I refer to the fairness critique as “Waldron’s argument,” but the
arguments made here apply with equal force to others who have invoked fairness as a reason
to reject traditionalism.
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the question of who should bear the costs of a particular injury as between the injurer
and her victim, and Waldron asks why we shouldn’t “abandon the framework that
confines our attention to the two of them, and seek a way of addressing accident
costs that does not involve arbitrary elements of this sort.”97 As such, it cannot be
used as an internal critique to favor one interpretation of tort law over another: it
applies with equal force to all theories of tort. The same point is made, from a
corrective justice perspective, by Perry:
[S]uch a claim would be based on a misunderstanding. Distributive
justice [only requires] that there be a uniform relative proportionality
between the need or merit or fault of each of the members in the
distributive group and the respective shares they receive . . . If we assume
with Prosser that the injurer in a particular case of harmful interaction was
at fault and that the victim was entirely innocent, then the only
proportionality that can rationally be sought is met by placing the entire
loss, whatever its size, on the injurer alone.98
The business of tort is to allocate a loss—whatever its size—to those who should
bear it. The debate between the law & economic theorists and the traditionalists is
what rule that allocation should be governed by: efficient reduction of accidents
costs or moral fault. To argue that the size of the loss is disproportionate to the
allocation rule simply misses the point of tort law, which is to take a preexisting loss
of whatever size and distribute it appropriately. True, the particular allocation rule
one advocates for might be subject to the problem of moral luck (for example,
blame-based theories in traditionalism), but the proportionality is an objection to tort
law qua tort law. And therefore the fairness critique of tort isn’t unique to
traditionalist theories, but would apply equally well to the perspective of the law &
economic theorists: in the same way that law & economic theorists wouldn’t defend
utterly draconian punishments on the mere ground of efficient reduction in crime, in
the realm of tort a critique of fundamental fairness would apply to equally the law &

97

Id. at 397. This is quite close to Coleman’s assertion that a wrongful loss gives rise to a
general or social obligation to redress, rather than applying only to the tortfeasor. See
sources cited supra, note 53. Waldron also claims that Coleman and others are wrong in
asserting that “the legal system is either imposing the loss on Fate or imposing the loss on
Hurt, and the only question is which.” Waldron, supra note 91, at 395. He says that it is:
[o]dd . . . almost to the point of incoherence, to say that a refusal by the courts to make
Fate compensate Hurt would amount to the imposition of liability on Hurt. Liability is
a two-term relation: if Fate is held liable, he is held liable to hurt. To whom, on
Coleman’s account, is Hurt held liable [. . .] ?
Id. The answer to this, of course, is no one. Waldron isn’t aware that the term “liability” can
be understood as something that “holds someone back; a handicap.” This is the everyday
sense of the word, in the way that we say things like, “My short temper is a liability.” I
suppose it’s a liability to me, but that is only in the same sense that Hurt’s loss is a liability to
him. All of this is just to point out that Coleman is, I think, exactly right in asserting that a
failure to assign Hurt’s loss to Fate is tantamount to saying that Hurt must bear the loss. Any
argument otherwise would have to be making implicit use of the doing/allowing distinction,
which isn’t the route Waldron is taking.
98

Perry, supra note 37, at 471.
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economics view. It is true that Waldron’s argument poses a problem for any
affirmative defense of tort law, but that is not the focus of this Article.
Second, Waldron’s argument incompletely analyzes the relationship between tort
law and retributive justice. Waldron’s fairness critique is predicated on the
discrepancy between just desserts and tort liability. But at the same time, he is only
concerned with moments of massive loss and minimal carelessness: he says, after all,
that it’s the “gaping disproportion between individual outcomes and morality”99 that
he is most concerned about, and recognizes that “[t]ort law is not criminal law, and
tort liability is certainly not supposed to duplicate retributive justice.”100 But if
Waldron is right that the tort law is unfair precisely because of this disconnect
between moral dessert and tort liability, why should we think that a small but real
discrepancy between the just desserts of the tortfeasor and the liability imposed on
her is permissible? That is, if tort law is not meant to duplicate retributive justice,
but is still beholden to a critique based on retributive justice grounds, just how much
unfairness is too much in tort, and why should we draw the line at any particular
point? This concern is particularly apparent a few pages later when Waldron
discusses an adaptation of David Lewis’s penal lottery as a response to his
unfairness argument:
In some contexts, macabre appropriateness may be all there is to fairness.
There is a strong strand of retributivism which holds that the imposition
on a miscreant of a pain, loss, or risk which exactly matches what he
imposed on his victim is a good thing in itself . . . But, as Coleman
reminded us, the logic of torts is not necessarily the logic of retribution.
In retributive justice, paying back the criminal for his crime is the whole
point . . . In tort, there is a different main point . . . .101
Waldron is using retributive justice as both a sword and a shield: it is sufficiently
connected to tort to throw out the entire institution as arbitrary and unfair, but not so
connected that a response to the fairness objection on retributive grounds gets
anywhere. Such an incompletely theorized objection—one that seems peculiarly
designed as an attack on tort law—should not be accepted.
Waldron’s objection also folds back into the broader discussion about moral
luck, demonstrating that the unfairness critique isn’t really so set apart as its
advocates might believe. As I noted in Part II, a host of philosophers—Nagel,
Williams, Thomson, and others—argue that the proper response to moral luck is to
say that luck does play a significant role in our evaluations of people’s moral
character.102 The fact that Fate, but not Fortune, actually caused significantly more
harm to his victim means that he is actually more blameworthy than Fortune, and the
99
100

Waldron, supra note 91, at 391.
Id. at 403.

101

Id. at 406 (emphasis added). As Goldberg and Zipursky point out, the Supreme Court
doesn’t consider compensatory damages “fines” within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, suggesting along these lines that tort doesn’t treat damages like punishment,
keyed to a notion of desert. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 3, at 1141 (citing BrowningFerris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263-64 (“[T]he Excessive
Fines Clause . . . does not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit.”)).
102

See supra Section II.B.
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concern about the relationship between blameworthiness and the amount of loss
evaporates. And so Waldron’s critique is based on an implicit assumption about
moral luck: namely, that the proper response to the issue is to give up on some of our
everyday judgments, rather than rejecting the control principle.103
Moreover, Waldron’s conclusion is something that I—and anyone else interested
in defending tort law—can agree with. An insurance scheme which more evenly
distributes wrongful losses might very well be a better system. But the fact that a
better system exists from a public policy perspective, or even as a matter of general
fairness or more broadly as a normative judgment, isn’t to say that we must reject
every alternative. In the criminal context, for example, we might prefer a system
that reduces the commission of crimes ex ante by investing in social programs rather
than punishing criminals ex post. But that doesn’t prove that it’s unjust to mete out
punishment to those who do break the law. Stating a preference for some state of
affairs isn’t to say that any other state of affairs is wrong.
Finally, Waldron’s argument is, at bottom, an intuition pump. He suggests that
our intuitive response to moments of carelessness and massive loss is that tort exacts
an unfair outcome in an unfortunate situation. Intuition pumps are, of course, a
common tool of philosophers and there is nothing wrong with using them. But in the
end, I have to admit that I just don’t buy it. It certainly is horrible that Fate has to
suffer such a significant loss as a result of his minimally negligent conduct. But it is
better that he—rather than Hurt or anyone else—bear it because he is the one who
wrongfully caused that loss. It would certainly be a much better state of affairs if
there were no loss, and perhaps it would even be better if a social insurance scheme
existed to spread the cost of the accident around a wider pool. But that does not
change the fact that, unless Hurt is compensated some other way, Fate has a duty to
make things right for Hurt.
V. UNINTENDED COMMITMENTS
At this point it is worth stepping back to consider the implications of the law &
economic theorists’ use of moral luck as an argument against traditionalism and
focus in on the other theoretical baggage that accompanies this argumentative move.
This Part highlights a wholly unrecognized problem of using moral luck in the
context of tort law and provides an independent basis for rejecting the objection.
Contrary to what the law & economic theorists might assume, if we do find that
moral luck requires us give up on any form of traditionalism, we will be forced to
take on quite a bit else in the field of moral philosophy. That is, even if the law &
economic theorist admits the moral luck objection doesn’t get traction against a nonblame-based traditionalist view and confines her critique to blame-based
traditionalism, this limited application of the argument still creates significant
problems. To see why, we should first consider again the options that are available
to deal with the problem of moral luck.
A. The Options
As I discussed above, the problem of moral luck is generated by the contradiction
between the control principle and a great many of our everyday moral judgments.
As a result, we have three options to resolve this conundrum: we can find that the
103

For a longer discussion about the ways we might respond to moral luck, see infra, Part
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problem is intractable and give up on the idea moral blameworthiness entirely, we
can reject our everyday moral judgments, or we can reject the control principle.
Let’s consider each of these options in turn.
1. Reject Normative Ethics
Our first option is to decide that the problem of moral luck is irresolvable: it is a
decisive objection to our understanding of normative ethics. The problem, this
argument goes, is that the control principle is too fundamental to be abandoned. The
idea that a person can be held morally responsible for something out of her control is
anathema to our most basic beliefs about morality. But at the same time, our
everyday moral judgments are infused with luck. Day in, day out, we make
judgments on the moral responsibility of people in ways that are based entirely on
fortune. As a result, there’s no way to make sense of the way we make moral
evaluations, and so we have to get out of the business altogether: moral judgments
are out; moral responsibility is out; and praise- and blameworthiness must likewise
be rejected. This would get us to where the outcome the law & economic theorist is
aiming for. If we give up on blame, we would of course be giving up on blame in
the context of tort law. This move might even require us to give up on an
obligations-based theory of tort. This goes back to the caveat I noted in Section
III.B: If we are giving up on the idea of blame entirely, we might conclude that there
isn’t much of a reason to care about our moral obligations in the first place. And if
giving up on blame entails our giving up on moral obligation, we would have to give
up on moral obligation in the context of the tort law.
2. Reject the Control Principle
Our second option is to choose to reject the control principle, as Nagel, Williams,
and Gardner urge us to do,104 and accept that blame is rife with luck. In the contest
between the control principle and our intuitive moral judgments, it is the control
principle that must give way. But the problem with this option for the law &
economic theorists is that if we adopt it, the problem of moral luck doesn’t get up off
the ground, and hence it poses no problem for traditionalism: if our everyday
judgments about blame really are infused with luck, then the law & economic
theorist cannot claim that tort law’s dependence on luck is at odds with blame.
We’ve handled the problem of moral luck by giving up on the premise that was
being used as a wedge against traditionalism—that people cannot be held
blameworthy for factors out of their control. In cases where it seems arbitrary that
A’s negligent conduct causes substantial injury while B’s negligence causes no harm
at all, there is a moral justification for tort law’s treating the two differently: A is
more blameworthy than B, and hthis is so just because his conduct harmed another
person.
3. Reject Our Intuitions
The last option has us give up our everyday intuitions and hold fast to the control
principle. When our intuitive moral judgments conflict with the control principle—
when we see consequential, circumstantial, or constitutive luck rear their ugly
heads—we should think that it’s our intuitions that have steered us wrong. But
doing so would require us to give up on more than just some of our moral
104

See sources cited supra note 15.
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intuitions.105 Consider consequential luck. Assuming that we hold steady to the
control principle, we must deny that there is a moral distinction between two
situations where the only difference has to do with a factor not under the agent’s
control. In the example of the two drivers discussed in Section I.B., Sally and Sue
bear the same degree of moral responsibility for their negligent driving. As a result,
we must accept the more general proposition that when an agent is held morally
blameworthy, the thing that she is held blameworthy for cannot be the consequences
she causes: otherwise Sally and Sue, who brought about different consequences,
could not be equally blameworthy. To be sure, this view is hardly revolutionary: a
number of thinkers from Kantians to rule utilitarians have thought that moral blame
isn’t dependent on the consequences of an agent’s actions. But at the same time, it is
not universally accepted, and it is compelled by our taking this third option.
Turning to circumstantial luck, the third option also requires us to reject our
moral judgments when they depend on circumstances that are outside of the agent’s
control, and thus conflict with the control principle. This again goes back to Section
I.B, and in particular to those cases where person A did do something morally
wrong, and person B would have done—but did not actually do—precisely the same
action if placed in the same circumstances. It was only because B had the good
fortune not to face that particular situation that she avoided the bad conduct. Our
intuitions suggest that A is more blameworthy than B. But as with consequential
luck, this intuition conflicts with the control principle: we assumed both that if B
were placed in the same situation as A, he would have engaged in the wrongful
conduct, and that it was outside of both parties’ control whether they did face that
particular situation. Having made these assumptions, we can say that it was out of
B’s control whether or not he actually engaged in the wrongful conduct. And since
the control principle holds that no one can be held to blame for those factors that are
out of her control, we must conclude that A and B are equally blameworthy. Now
we’ve arrived at a less intuitive proposition: most people are uneasy about the idea
of holding a person blameworthy only because she would have done a bad thing if
the circumstances were different, but didn’t actually do the bad thing, yet that is
exactly the claim we must adopt. Moreover, in the same way we rejected that
consequences can serve as the basis for moral blame, we must now also reject the
notion that a person is morally blameworthy for her acts or intentions:106 because A
and B must be held equally blameworthy and A and B committed different acts and
had different intentions, their blameworthiness cannot be dependent on either their
acts or their intentions. In other words, the problem of circumstantial luck poses a
conflict between our being responsible for our actions and intentions, on the one
hand, and the control principle, on the other. As a result, we have to give up on our
acts or intentions serving as the basis for moral blame.
Having concluded that a person cannot be held blameworthy for the
consequences she causes, her conduct, or her intentions, we have to consider what
105
While no particular paper makes the argument I put forward in this Section explicitly,
Daniel Statman’s Moral Luck provides background reading that fleshes out my analysis. See
generally MORAL LUCK, supra note 15.
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By “intentions” I mean to draw a distinction between an agent’s actions or the
consequences she causes and what she intended her actions or consequences to be. In
criminal law, this comes up in the context of mens rea. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, and in
mistakes of law and fact defenses, at § 2.04.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012

25

82

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:57

she can be blamed for. Daniel Statman makes what might now be the obvious move
in his introduction to Moral Luck when he compares two people, one who actually
committed a murder and the other who attempted to do so but failed: “In the eyes of
God, the actual and the would-be murderers bear the same blame.”107 While this
position might sound a bit too theological, Statman is trying to bring out the
distinction between evaluating an agent’s actions and evaluating the agent herself.
The idea follows one of Judith Jarvis Thompon’s formulations of blame:
A person P is to greater or lesser blame for doing (or being) such and
such, where his doing (or being) the such and such is unwelcome, just in
case P’s doing (or being) the such and such is a stronger or weaker reason
to think that P is a bad person.108
People are to blame, in other words, for just those things that indicate they are bad,
in a moral sense. Thomson is certainly not the first thinker to propose such an
interpretation of blame: the idea of a moral character in one form or another can be
traced directly to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and is a central feature of
contemporary virtue ethics. Nevertheless, the quote nicely captures the idea that
blame has something to do with a person’s character. A similar view is defended by
Nomy Arpaly. Arpaly begins her discussion on moral worth with Kant’s so-called
“prudent grocer,” the person who fairly charges his young clients for the goods they
buy even though he could get away with unethically charging more. He does this
not because it is the right thing to do but because he knows that if he made it a
practice to overcharge people who didn’t know better, his reputation would be
tarnished and his business would suffer. Arpaly argues, in the same vein as Barbara
Herman,109 that even if the prudent grocer did the right thing every time, there is still
something about his act which isn’t morally praiseworthy: “[T]he grocer’s morally
right action does not stem from any responsiveness on his part to moral reasons.”110
She claims that because the grocer’s “reasons for action do not correspond to the
action’s right-making features,”111 his actions do not display or have any moral
worth. “For an agent to be morally praiseworthy for doing the right thing is for her
to have done the right thing for the relevant moral reasons – that is, the reasons for
which she acts are identical to the reasons for which the action is right.”112
Turning back to tort law, our third option of giving up on our intuitions in favor
of the control principle does work well for the law & economic theorist: the idea is
that when the control principle and our everyday intuitions conflict, we should give
up on our intuitions. In the realm of torts, that means that when the control principle
conflicts with principles of tort law, we should give up on the idea that tort law has
anything to do with blame.
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Daniel Statman, supra note 15, at 20.

108

Judith Jarvis Thomson, Morality and Bad Luck, in MORAL LUCK, supra note 15, at 202.
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Barbara Herman, On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty, 90 PHIL. REV. 359
(1981).
110

NOMY ARPALY, UNPRINCIPLED VIRTUE 72 (2003).
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Id. at 72.
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B. The Upshot
The upshot of all this is, again, pretty straightforward. The law & economic
theorists’ use of moral luck requires their taking on much more than they bargained
for. By making use of the problem of moral luck to attack blame-based views of
traditionalism, the law & economic theorist has two options: (i) give up on the idea
of moral responsibility altogether, or (ii) claim that moral blame is grounded in
judgments about an agent’s character, rather than in consequences, acts, or
intentions. With regard to the former, recognize how much of our most fundamental
beliefs we’ve jettisoned: we’ve rejected morality outright. People are no longer
accountable for what they do. Our everyday reactive attitudes about other peoples’
behavior, our judgments about good and bad conduct, the very idea that we have
obligations to be honest or compassionate or virtuous, must be rejected. I won’t go
into too much detail here, as there is a vast and well-respected literature about the
dangers of going down this path,113 but it is enough to say that precisely because this
option requires such a revolutionary departure from of our most basic beliefs – a
move that we are incapable as a matter of human psychology to make114 – it’s a
nonstarter. “It follows that to object to moral luck tout court is to object to morality
tout court . . . The conclusion is absurd – agency does have some reach and moral
judgment does have some area of application – so something must have gone wrong
in the premises.”115 In any case, if this truly is the position the law & economic
theorists want us to adopt, it’s safe to say that it is a revolutionary departure from
people’s everyday beliefs and extraordinarily controversial. And that is precisely my
point: using moral luck as a means to attack traditionalist theories of tort goes handin-hand with taking on some very counterintuitive positions on moral theory.
If, as I think they must, the law & economic theorists take the latter route instead
and adopt a character-based conception of moral blame, they have saddled
themselves with a very particular view in normative ethics, contrary to Nagel,116
Williams,117 Gardner, most consequentialists and Kantians,118 and a host of others.
And while this is a defensible position that isn’t nearly so radical as rejecting all of
moral blame outright, it isn’t uncontroversial.
I think this point is particularly fascinating, and up to now totally unrecognized.
When Posner, Calabresi, and others claim that tort law cannot be understood as a law
of moral wrongs just because of the arbitrary manner in which recovery is had, they
are implicitly requiring us to give up on a great many of our everyday moral
judgments. The claim “moral luck poses a decisive objection to blame-based
113
For a worthwhile account of how America’s reaction to the horrors of World War II was
a resurgence of natural law and the creation of a particular conception of individual rights, see
RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS (1999).
114

STRAWSON, supra note 40.

115

GARDNER, supra note 23, at 24.

116

“True enough—if the [moral luck] objection makes sense. But, as Negal established, it
does not.” GARDNER, supra note 23, at 24.
117

See WILLIAMS, supra note 15.
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While I’m not sure whether Kant himself would have been willing to reject the control
principle, John Gardner makes an interesting case for that interpretation. GARDNER, supra note
23 (starting at page 57).
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theories of traditionalism” requires adoption of the assertion, “moral blame is based
on an evaluation of an agent’s character, not the consequences she brings about, the
acts she does, or the intentions she has.” And while I am sympathetic to the position
that the control principle is so fundamental it cannot be rejected, the law & economic
theorists now have to contend with a large philosophical literature that vociferously
argues otherwise. The onus is on them to provide us with some kind of explanation
about why this is the route to take.
*

*

*

There’s a counterargument to the broader argument here that bears considering.
My claim is that using the moral luck objection in the realm of tort theory requires
taking on some controversial positions in moral philosophy. I’ve suggested that law
& economic theorists must go with the third option (holding on to the control
principle when it comes in conflict with our everyday intuitions) rather than the first
(reject all of normative ethics out of hand). But someone with a particular view of
the law & economics movement might answer the critique by saying that law &
economic theorists would choose that first option.
The assumption of
interdisciplinary economics is that the best to way to understand most – perhaps all –
disciplines is to view them through the lens of a particular methodology: individual
rationality as utility maximization. For tort law, that means adopting the rules that
most efficiently reduce the cost of accidents.119 But if we’re now moving onto the
field of normative ethics, the law & economic theorist is just going to give the same
response – she will say that I’ve employed the wrong methodology for moral
philosophy. The question of who we should praise and blame, like all questions
from the law & economic theorist’s perspective, is a question about who it would be
good to blame.120 So when I summarily dismissed the first option as an unviable one
for the law & economic theorist, I misconstrued their position.
There are a few reasons why I think this objection isn’t going to get up off the
ground. One significant error of this line of thinking is the assumption that the law
& economic theorist is an economist “all the way down” (or if that sounds too
reductivist, “all the way through”). To say that you are a law & economic theorist
means you think economic methodology plays an important role in either descriptive
or normative accounts of the law. And in the context of tort, that means economic
methodology can most profitably be used to analyze tort as an efficient reducer of
accident costs.121 But why would someone who has this view of tort law—or of
119

It’s a non-obvious proposition that utility maximization in tort law equates to efficient
reduction of accident costs: even if we buy the maxim “rationality is utility maximization,”
we’ve got to figure out what “utility” means. The law & economic theorists seem to have
come to believe that in tort, it’s the reduction of accident costs; but we could instead think it’s
about any number of other candidates, including a number of so-called “collateral benefits”
like efficient conveyance and dissemination of important information or providing a forum for
conversations we believe should take place in a public forum. See Scott Hershovitz, Harry
Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 74 (2010) (arguing in part that
the law & economic theorists have unjustifiably limited their scope in the costs and benefits
they consider in the context of tort.).
120

Thanks to Scott Hershovitz for noting this possible response and helping me to think
through its implications.
121

Well, not exactly. It might mean something else. See supra note 119.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss1/3

28

2012]

TORT, MORAL LUCK, AND BLAME

85

contract law, or securities law, or sociology, or whatever—think that this way of
thinking necessarily applies to moral philosophy, or any other field, for that matter?
Why, in other words, does a law & economic theorist automatically become a
normative ethics & economic theorist? This move is, contrary to the assumption of
many practicing law & economic theorists, not an obvious one: even if I grant that a
particular set of legal doctrines is best explained, normatively or descriptively, as
utility maximization – and even if I believe that “utility” means something like cost
in terms of material wealth – why does that require me to further believe that the vast
majority of Western moral thought is egregiously off the mark, that morality isn’t
anything more than a tool to bring about desirable social ends, and that ethics is
justified by a utilitarian viewpoint?122 This all goes back to the point that was made
much more forcefully and cogently by Don Herzog.123 The dispute between, in
Herzog’s parlance, the political theorists and economists is not whether economics
can ever be used in any discipline: as he says, “[A]ny competent social or political
theorist will have some economics implements in her toolbox . . . .”124 But before
we start pulling out our calculators and tallying up costs and benefits in normative
ethics, we have to have two additional arguments: (i) a good reason to think that, in
this context, rational human behavior is best understood as utility maximization, and
nothing more, and (ii) a thick account of what “utility” is in this context (preference
satisfaction? Moral worth? Eudemonia? Happiness? Knowledge? Virtue? There
are a lot of possibilities here, and they’re hotly contested). Following through on
this second issue, it’s not clear that happiness or preference satisfaction—what we
commonly take the word “utility” to mean—is the right way to look at moral
responsibility. You might instead have the following view: it makes sense to think
of rationality as wealth maximization when we’re talking about markets. After all,
for the market to function the way we want it to, at least some people must act in
precisely this way.125 But when we start talking about praise- and blameworthiness,
we care about something totally different. An agent is blameworthy not because she
reduced overall wealth, preference satisfaction, or happiness, but because she
engaged in wrongful conduct. Or perhaps because she intended to engage in
wrongful conduct, whether or not she actually did so. Or maybe it has something to
do with her moral character. There are a lot of different theories on the table,126 but
the point is that none are suggesting that blameworthiness is something we should
feel free to twist and contort to bring about a preferential outcome. No matter what
you think about economic analysis in tort law or any other field, you have to give
some reason for thinking it applies in the context of normative ethics. And that
answer can’t be grounded in appeals to maximizing benefits and minimizing costs,
lest it degrade into circularity: we should think about blameworthiness in terms of
122
This is emphatically not the same as saying, “I am a utilitarian,” or any other type of
consequentialist. A utilitarian believes that a person is obligated to do that which maximizes
utility; what justifies this assertion is another question entirely.
123
Don Herzog, Externalities and Other Parasites, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 895 (2000). And I
do mean much more forcefully.
124

Id. at 923.
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See id. at 902−03.

126

See SCANLON, supra note 39.
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the costs and benefits it brings about because if we did, that would bring about the
best mix127 of costs and benefits.128
Perhaps law & economic theorists have some very good reasons to take these
positions. But that is precisely my point: using the moral luck objection in tort law
requires us to take on some controversial views in other areas and we have to think
seriously about whether these views are correct. We cannot uncritically apply
economic models to all areas of human life.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have highlighted the general difference between the traditionalist
and law & economic theorist approaches to tort law. A common criticism leveled
against the traditionalists is that the way in which tort law permits recovery is
morally arbitrary, and therefore tort cannot be a law of wrongs and redress. But,
moral luck poses a problem only for our understanding of moral blame, and I have
shown that most strains of traditionalism do not depend in any significant way on
praise- or blameworthiness. Moreover, the use of moral luck against traditionalism
requires the law & economic theorist to take some very specific and controversial
positions in moral philosophy, positions that have up to this point gone totally
undefended by these theorists. In the end, I hope to have provided some insight into
just what the problem of moral luck is and what implications flow from its use in the
context of tort law. Doing so will, I hope, be a first step in recognizing that tort law
speaks to us not as policymakers interested in efficiently allocating certain kinds of
losses or as judges of the personal failings of others, but rather as ethical agents,
concerned about what the moral law requires us to do.

127

Even in the realm of tort, it isn’t always clear which view law & economic theorists
have in mind when they invoke the terms “maximization” or “efficiency.” It might be a
simple maximization function of costs and benefits (y = C - B), but some have invoked at least
two now-famous alternatives: (1) Pareto efficiency, where an allocation is optimal if at least
one individual is made better off without making any other individual worse off. It is of
course possible for a change to the status quo to be Pareto efficient but it not be the case that
y2>y1. And (2) Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, where a change is optimal if the individual who
gains the advantage can compensate those who were made worse off, even if they never do.
This type of efficiency is similarly non-determinative of either simple maximization or Pareto
efficiency.
128
It’s worth mentioning that even hard-line consequentialists don’t have to go as far as the
law & economic theorists have in this discussion. A consequentialist is committed to saying
that our moral obligations are defined by the maximization of some good or set of goods: an
agent ought to do that, and only that, which maximizes whatever is “good,” whether it be
utility, honor, moral worth, or something else altogether. But that doesn’t require the
utilitarian to say that a person has to be blamed for each failure to fulfill her obligations. As
I’ve stressed repeatedly above, having a theory about what we’re obligated to do doesn’t tell
us what we’re to praise or blame for.
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